Tuesday, November 28, 2017

Next War








28 November 2017

The Next War in the Middle East

By: Karsten Riise

After Syria, war again is coming to the Middle East. But where and how? And who will lose?



War lost in Syria and Iraq

Israel and Saudi Arabia have both lost their proxy-forces in Syria and Iraq - only the Kurds in northern Syria remain, confronted by Turkey. This has left Israel and Saudi Arabia naked. They will have to fight themselves. Israel and Saudi Arabia are now themselves the “proxy-forces” – of the USA.

After defeat by proxy, the aggressiveness of Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA against their image of “Iran” remains.

Traditional International Relations theory, especially the “realist” school, normally emphasizes (more or less objective) “state-interests” and “power-relations”, and not state-internal factors like ideology and leadership individuals, as drivers of international politics. But we must revise International Relations theory. Because here we cannot overlook the driving forces of emotions and the special leadership-personalities and the mutual connectedness in the leaderships of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the USA.

This should, however, not let us forget also to look at the background of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, where Paul Wolfowitz (rightly or wrongly), was quoted for saying: “The road to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad”. The vision of the USA was to “nip” Iraq, take Iran along, and continue a US sweep through Syria to Beirut. The US aim was not only to eliminate Saddam, but also Iran, Al-Assad, and Hezbollah (indeed everything deemed “evil”) on the way.

This big plan, if indeed it was one, has now, at end of 2017, at last failed utterly.


Alliance with inner fractures

After missing the Iran-war and losing influence after the bloody wars inside Iraq-Syria, there is a feeling of unfulfillment among the losers.

There is an enormous desire, an open aggressiveness publicly displayed,  in all the three leaderships of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and USA, for more war against what is spoken-of as “Iran”. On top of the sense of loss, there seems to be a psychological motif of “revenge” against an “Iran” daring not to fall victim, but instead crossing their plans for the Region. Feelings of hurt or even humiliated ambition may play in.

Creating mayhem may in this context even contain an objective by itself.

Israeli newspaper Haaretz now writes of Saudi Arabia as Israel’s possible “dreampartner” of choice. Israel prepares its Northern District for war, and stages its biggest air-force exercise ever. In the USA, the New York Times in an “official” article recently paints a romantic picture of Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia there are plans for a mega-city close to Israel with big US investors. A new Saudi leadership, ascending after talks with the USA, describes the US leader as “the right man at the right time”. Saudi Arabia denounces “Iran” in the Arab League. USA “decertifies” the Iran-deal for no objective reasons. There is an open “bromance” between the key top-persons in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the USA.

The bromance between Israel and Saudi Arabia is in many ways contradictory. Absent a mutual enemy-image (“Iran”), it would probably have deep cleavages. Imagine theoretically, if one Arab power could in 10 years take-over all power in all the Middle East surrounding Israel (and such a power might eventually become nuclear)  – could then Israel with the Holy City of Jerusalem not end-up isolated and taken-on also, at the end? Nobody in Israel seems wanting to apply such old concepts like “divide and rule”, now. Cool-headed realist thinking seems shrinking in Israel, where many seem absorbed by the illusionary simplicity of creating a “peace on their own terms” by attacking one single symbolic enemy-image, and “betting all the farm” on one perceived “dreampartner”.

Late King Al-Saudi, the founding father of Saudi Arabia, expressed great reservations (to put it mildly) against Israel in letters to US president Franklin Roosevelt, and these reservations probably continue in many powerful circles within Saudi Arabia. The latest changes in Saudi Arabia also affected someone, who had been cooperated at high level with US security interests. As Saddam Hussein, Gadhafi and Mubarak experienced, Arabs cooperating with the USA, will not necessarily see a pay-off.

In the USA, reciprocal reservations exist, symbolized by the unanimous (!) adoption in Congress as recently as last year (2016) of the “Justice against Sponsors of Terrorism Act”, which targets Saudi Arabia. US institutions, including State Department, take part in a deep inner US split over the latest developments in the Middle East.

The newfound “dream-alliance” has deep inner fractures.

Meanwhile, the mutually shared fear & aggressiveness against “Iran” are repeated so loudly in unison in Israel, Saudi Arabia and USA, that these aggressions nearly HAVE to find a physical expression. Especially more so, the more its other symbolic physical and diplomatic exertions seem to get them nowhere in Yemen, Qatar and Lebanon, and indirectly even in their relations with Turkey, which supports Qatar.

A multitude of mostly unrelated, but strongly destabilizing social currents, within their mutual partner Egypt, only strengthen their psychological feeling of being threatened. According to Robert Fisk, Egypt has about 60,000 political prisoners, some are religious, others are liberal. Egypt as a fourth ”dream-partner” is deeply fractured too, developing the same devastating signs of inner conflict, as Syria.


Some roads to War seem blocked

How can the combined aggressiveness against the symbolic image of “Iran” find an outlet?

Iraq seems today, end of 2017, after much, much bloodshed to be more unified than perhaps ever in her history since WWII. A Saudi invasion against Iraq to install an “anti-Iran” leadership in Baghdad, seems out of the question, at least for a very considerable time. This thereby also precludes a Saudi land-war against Iran, because Iraq is the only land-bridge connecting them. Syria seems also stabilized.

Facts on the ground leave Lebanon as the only second option for creating more serious mayhem, apart from the on-going starvation-war in Yemen.

For a possible war in Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the USA and not least the “Arab NATO” response-force of 40,000 soldiers with Egyptian participation under the Arab League, could all come into play.

But how?


Lebanon - first Option for more War

Saudi Arabia and her allies based in Egypt have no land-access to Lebanon. The only land-access would go through Israel. But transporting a large Sunni-Arab army peacefully through Israel, to make war in Lebanon, will not happen.

What might conceivably happen, could be a bizarre kind of “replay” of the 1956 Suez-War:

Israel could start to invade Lebanon from the South under any pretext whatsoever (Israel has never needed an excuse for invading Lebanon). As the Israeli military presses towards Beirut, the “Arab NATO” response force under Saudi leadership could insert land-troops (by ship from Alexandria) in Israeli occupied ports, to “persuade” Israel to “stop” her invasion and to “save” Arab Lebanon. Like the British-French “intervention” in Suez 1956, such a theatre would all be pre-arranged.

Once there, Saudi-led “Arab-NATO” forces (with US advice and support) could “regime-change” the Lebanese government, and start a (very long) war to wipe-out the war-trained Hezbollah. That such a venture would be a sure catastrophe for all involved, would not necessarily count as a relevant argument against it among those personalities, who would ponder it.

The necessary preparations could easily be bigger than the patience of its protagonists, and lack of preparations will equal disaster. Even for the most aggressive activist leaders, such an endeavor should beforehand look deterrently difficult – which does not necessary prevent them from starting it.



Last Option for War

As the “Lebanese option” above is extremely difficult, one ultimate option remains.

A last resort remains, for creating some greater-scale symbolic mayhem against the image of “Iran”. It’s the Americans’ favorite “quick-fix” substitute for a solution: Air attack.

Iran has virtually no modern combat aircraft, probably less than 50 up-to-date units for 1.4 million square-kilometers. For air defense, Iran is in practice undefended, even with a few Russian S-300 missiles for point defense. The magazines of Iran’s S-300 air-defense are shallow, and could be depleted with a first salvo of conventional missiles. Iran is an inviting target for air attack.

Iran’s nuclear installations serve both as symbolic pretext and object of an aggression. Saudi Arabia would herself have to handle retaliating Iranian missiles, so Saudi Arabia would need at least a minimal excuse for an air-raid. But Israel would not even need a fig leaf of excuse for attacking.

And what other way would be more “easy”, most assertively symbolic, showing-off Israel’s power and status, and with assuredly no own casualties (at least in the first round), than using Israel’s Jericho missiles. Israeli missiles, which in order to create enough destruction & demonstration to achieve the war-objectives, could be fit with nuclear tips.

Air attack against Iran – either with air planes (Saudi Arabia) or missiles (Israel) – is tempting to start in anger. But a long-drawn conflict, including a very long oil-blockade in the Persian Gulf, would ensue. Such an action, once started, would be nearly impossible to end.


Next War – the Outcome

Some months ago, I started research for this article, because I saw at that point, that Saudi Arabia had perspectives to become a very important global power. However, within the last 6 months, a lot of cards have been played - and lost. The situation is now very different.

Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA have lost already - they stand to lose again. If they do nothing, they will lose more, as Iran and Iraq gain from international trade, and Syria and Hezbollah build up themselves.

But Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA will not do nothing, that is for sure. This is not their style - or temper. They will do something.

But anything on a greater scale which they can do, is at risk of releasing such fateful events, that in the end, they will lose much more.


Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor


CHANGE NEWS &
CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Thursday, April 6, 2017

Middle East balance








Published on the web of
Prof. Martin van Creveld
http://www.martin-van-creveld.com/2017/04/




6 April 2017

Air Forces
Balance of Power in the Middle East

By: Karsten Riise


Air forces are of colossal importance in the Balance of Power between states. Without air superiority, a state is open for huge devastation from potential adversaries. To get a clearer picture of the Balance of Power in the Middle East, I therefore decided to focus on the balance of assets for air superiority in the Wider Middle East - see figure 1:


Figure 1


Methodology

My methodology in figure 1 is straight forward: Only high-end fighter (or multirole) aircraft in service are relevant for the contestation of air space. It is assumed high-end fighters in service have received all technical upgrades for high-end status. Light or older fighter aircraft are shown, but may quickly be eliminated.  To keep the methodology robust, I focus on the sheer number of high-end air superiority fighters. Only easily available, open sources have been used.

Readiness is a significant quantifiable factor which has not been easily available. If a modern air force has a normal readiness of for example 70%, it may well be, that Iran, due to lack of spare parts, lack of instruments, lack of trained pilots and technicians, may have a readiness of only 35%. If that is the case, the effective force of Iran would be only half of what her number of 44 high-end units indicates, bringing Iran's total force down to 22 comparable "units of force-level".

The "qualitative factors" like pilot-training, support-structures, leadership, configuration of bases, communication, support from other assets (ground-sensors, AWACS, satellites) etc. can be decisive. Also lethality and availability of modern munitions (e.g. air-to-air missiles) go into this. A "quality-factor" is difficult to measure, but it is still possible to say something in general about "quality" level. If USA=100 in "quality-factor", it is generally accepted that Israel's "quality-factor" is probably quite above 100, that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are probably a bit below 100, and that Iran is very much lower due to lack of training, and other modern assets. In this analysis, I will not measure "quality-factors", just point to them. 


Overview

Figure 1 brings up four issues for my discussion: First, Iran's obvious lack of air power against all of her many competitors. Second, the enormous increase in GCC air power, not least in Saudi Arabia. Third, the balance of power in relation to Israel. Fourth, the issue of nuclear weapons.


Iran - vacuum of air-power

Iran has only got 44 high-end aircraft to disperse, and they may not all be upgraded to deserve "high-end" status. Due to lack of training, spare parts etc. it may well be that Iran's readiness factor is only half of her neighboring countries, which means that her 44 units may only count as a "force-level" of 22. These 22 units of "force-level" have to be split up in (minimum) 3-6 sectors to defend a vast territory of 1,6 million km2, leaving only a meager 3-7 units of modern "force-level" per defense sector. It is obvious, that Iran does not possess any of the air assets necessary to protect her air space, not even against the air force of her smallest neighbors. Deficits in other "qualitative" combat factors like pilot-training only reinforce this conclusion. A few S-300 anti-air missiles may serve as a "trip-wire" for point-defense, but without a comprehensive, layered integrated air defense system, a few S-300 do not change the overall picture of a nearly undefended air space. The regional stability risk, therefore, seems not to be that Iran becomes "too strong", but rather, that Iran in terms of air defense is a power-vacuum, which could invite intrusion from any of her numerous competitors. Iran does possess a substantial number of surface-to-surface missiles of considerable range, which are often cited (especially by USA sources) as a "threat". But you cannot win a war with surface-to-surface missiles alone, and all of Iran's competitors have got effective Patriot missile defenses. In view of Iran's lack of air power, Iran's surface-to-surface missiles are a stand-alone capability. Iran's missiles must merely be seen as a deterrent, in other words a defensive capability, which stabilizes the region, because Iran's missiles discourage attack on Iran. Iran also possesses a capability of armed speed-boats, land-to-sea missiles etc. which can obstruct the oil traffic in the Persian Gulf. This marine capability, like Iran's conventionally armed land-to-land missiles, must also in the overall context be seen as a deterrent, discouraging attack on Iran, but not a capability which gives Iran encouragement for a very adventurous strategy. As it will appear below in figure 2 and 3, Iran is not investing an overly great portion of her economy in military.  

Is this "good" or "bad"? Well, anyone reserving a "right" to attack Iran, may think it is "good".  Given the troubling experiences in the region of turning a functioning country into havoc and chaos, it may arguably also be "bad".


GCC - enormous increase in air-power

All the GCC countries relative to their size possess very large quantities of high-end air assets. The GCC total is 409 aircraft, and with 349 units more on order, this group is on way to an inventory of 758 units. In comparison, France and Britain have a total of 369 high-end units, according to the same sources. Even the smaller GCC-states have by a wide margin plenty of assets against Iran. Saudi Arabia alone has got 222 units, and 156 more on order, for a total of 378 units. An additional order of 72 Eurofighters is under consideration, which could bring Saudi Arabia up to 450 units. According to GlobalSecurity.org, Saudi Arabia has also asked for 100 units of F-35 "stealth" fighters. If Saudi Arabia is denied F-35 from the USA, she may instead choose to buy J-31 "stealth" fighters from China. That might bring the Royal Saudi Air Force up to 550 units. Saudi Arabia also possesses 13 units of E3-sentry AWACS. In comparison, NATO for patrolling all its Eastern flank from Norway to Turkey (4,000+ km) has got about 16 similar units.

The question comes up, why Saudi Arabia invests in air superiority assets on such a large scale. Air force may be the most expensive part of Saudi Arabian military spending, and Saudi Arabia's military spending of 13.7% of GDP in 2015 is the third the highest in the world after Oman (and South Sudan, not shown) - see figure 2:

Figure 2 
















Oil prices have been high for many of the preceding years. Surplus money may tempt military spending. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia's high air force investments are felt now that oil incomes have been depressed the last few years, and Saudi Arabia also wants to invest huge sums of money in diversifying her economy to achieve a broader economic footing to prepare for her "post-oil" era in due time. 

Intentions are never known for sure, and may even change. I will go through a range of seven theoretical types of thinkable intentions. First, air forces have prestige. But the "bling" factor can hardly explain investment on this scale. Second, "defense against Iran" can be ruled out as a reason, because the Iranian air force is so small, ref above. Third, the Saudi Arabian and GCC assets are so numerous, that an offensive strategy (for example against Iran) may be a possibility, especially if the Patriot systems (which all the GCC countries have) are effective to defend against possible retaliatory missile strikes. Fourth, protection of Saudi Arabia against internal revolts, might theoretically be thought of, but the Saudi Arabian air force seems bigger than needed for that. Fifth, Saudi Arabia might seek the role of a great regional power. For the general role as a regional power, Saudi Arabia will need a strong navy to complement her air force in power-projection. And according to the open sources used here, Saudi Arabia actually has got an ambitious navy program with 7 frigates, 4 corvettes, and contemplates buying 2-3 destroyers, including the powerful American Arleigh Burke class, plus the advanced Freedom class littoral combat ship. Submarines are missing. For power projection, Saudi Arabia also has 2 tanker aircraft, 3 more tankers on order, plus a number of heavy transport aircraft. Saudi Arabia also has a satellite program, but her missile force seems not built out. Sixth, Saudi Arabia might not rule out, that a conflict with Israel could erupt one day, willingly or unwillingly, perhaps just due to misunderstandings. Here, however, Israel is in possession of the "great peacekeeper" in form of nuclear devices. Seventh, we may look at the timing of Saudi Arabia's increase in military spending - see figure 3:




Figure 3

















The acceleration in Saudi Arabian military spending started 2004/2005, after the USA war for "regime change" in Iraq. It might be thinkable, that Saudi Arabia wants to have an "insurance policy", that such an American action should never be turned against Saudi Arabia. To make this effective, Saudi Arabia would need to add aircraft from non-US suppliers, and (better) to have themselves the kind of "devices" which Israel has in possession. All this is of course theoretical, because the surge in Saudi Arabian military spending since 2004/2005 also to some degree coincides with a higher general level of oil prices.


Israel - the balance

Iran's air force is not a threat to Israel in any foreseeable future. Even Iran's missiles are probably not a major threat, due to Israel's Patriot, which are layered with other missile defense systems. From figure 1, it appears that Israel in relatively few years will have 366 fighter aircraft against 1,046 fighters (or more) from the GCC-countries, Egypt and Jordan. These countries are not Israel's enemies, and Israel has good practical relations with all of them. However, a coming numerical disadvantage of 3:1 is something to think about, even taking into account Israeli historical superiority in training, her satellite assets etc..


Nuclear weapons

As demonstrated above, in the conventional regional balance of power, Israel is easily outnumbered. But it isn't the number of aircraft or the high standards of Israeli pilots, which keep Israel free from major conflicts. 

Israel being free from major conflict simply hinges on Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. This will also apply, if more sides of a potential conflict possess them. The nuclear situation goes into all regional political calculations about establishing working relationships with Israel or not, and if not, then "how-to-not", that is, keeping possible actions on a level short-of-(major)-war. Nuclear weapons "overlay" the conventional balance of power. 

A country with nuclear weapons has less need to upkeep a conventional balance of forces. But this does not make conventional weapons dispensable, because nuclear weapons are politically ineffective, if a country does not have a minimum of conventional force to effectively handle intermediate steps of escalation between perfect peace and total armageddon. Air policing in peace time is an illustration - if a country does not have sufficient conventional means to expel intruding aircraft, it might experience significant blackmail and political degradation, even if in  possession of nuclear weapons. This is something to think about in the (sometimes rather narrow) discussion of Iran and possible nuclear weapons, exactly in view of Iran's lack of up-to-date conventional power (ref. figure 1 above). This intricate logic also applies, when both or even quite many sides of different potential conflicts might one day have nuclear weapons. As an example, the North Korean military may be overgrown in its conventional size, but still, possession of nuclear weapons would not make it possible for North Korea to dispense with a substantial minimum of conventional force. This will also apply, if nuclear weapons should spread in the often quite tense and potentially multidimensionally conflictual region of the Wider Middle East. 

Notably, nuclear weapons do not prevent "low-level" conflicts from erupting - or persisting. 



Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor

CHANGE NEWS &

CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Thursday, February 9, 2017

Israel's future








9 February 2017

One state

By: Karsten Riise

The Middle East was the subject of my very first analysis on global security. I did that already in basic school, it was just after the 1973-war. We should write some piece about geography, so I typed on a typewriter with illustrations and all, my own strategic analysis of the conflict of 1973.

My conclusion still holds: No party can create a decisive victory. Locked conflict. Stalemate.

Now, some decades after my rather successful analysis in basic school, I continue to look at the same issue. Although stalemate can hold for decades (as I foresaw) - no stalemate holds forever.

The military superiority of the State of Israel will in the next decades not increase. It can and will only decrease. This may happen unnoticed for a couple of decades - even with what may temporarily (but falsely) appear at some moment to be a further strengthening. In fact, the long-run relative decrease in the relative power of the State of Israel will probably be denied vehemently by great many notable persons and ordinary people there and there, just while it happens. Like a bridge losing its strength. Slowly at the beginning, then after one or two decades more visibly, and even later less deniably, gradual loss of control and supremacy will become evident to some, and then to more. Not necessarily as an "awakening" after a big all-out conflict, a short-term result of any larger conflict may even obscure the long-term development.

But the development I envision will show itself through this, that, and that - countless never ceasing, continuous and possibly ever more pressing conflictual events, as the table slowly, very slowly, turns. Also, the diplomatic balance (the power to be heard by the rest of the world) in the region will also slowly (or actually suddenly, for instance if due to some catastrophic event) change within the coming number of decades.

Such a diplomatic turn may be reinforced step-by-step (perhaps soon, or perhaps over decades) with the development of the surrounding types of government, with the regional human & economic development, and of course as the military strength of surrounding countries develop. This development eventually cannot be  stopped, even though (like e.g with the nuclear issue) it may be delayed, manipulated, obfuscated and temporarily blocked many, many times.

So in a way, as the relative power of the State of Israel will not increase, there will never be a moment for peace, which will be more advantageous for the State of Israel, than now. The obstacle hereto is the existence of an illusion: The very large relative power-advantage of the State of Israel today may lure great many people to think, that this will hold forever - and that therefore (at least in the view of some people) no peace will ever be needed (or even be desirable to them), or at least that it shouldn't happen now. Because humans who feel they have a great relative power-advantage often want more of this and more of that, and they can trap themselves by spending their time in pursuit of things which they will in the long run (decades) not be able to hold on to.

A pursuit of such things may, in an illusionary way, look like building up strength, but in a later phase it will turn out to be exactly the opposite. Such a development is a classic theme in human history, which has been treated by poets and speakers from probably all religions, plus a great many philosophers, for centuries and millenia.

A lot of international initiatives (still on the official agenda of a great many countries and organizations) have been made for a so-called "two-state" negociation. I think the time has passed for that, and perhaps indeed the "two-state" idea was never viable. If this is correct, the only one other road that will exist, will be "one state". This is no easy way. In fact, some explicitly discarded such an idea as either undesirable or not-viable already long ago. There may indeed also be some here or there saying "yes - only one - and only for us" - which may lead to even more tragedy.

We have seen in Lebanon, how such a "one state" may develop. Lebanon may even suggest, that such a "one state" may only come to a peace within itself, after all parties have experienced the hard way, that they must live together. Though Lebanon also gives hope, the necessary human realization (and thus such a peace) may even be precarious. Such a development will of course, mean a development also in the idea regarding the basis of the state, if there is one state. And after that, a number of individuals there, or there, may decide to seek their fortunes in other places rather than to continue on such terms - which might, in such a theoretical case, be an issue which must be foreseen and managed by the world. The conflict in Algeria in the 1950'ies is something to learn from, not as a prognosis, but at least as a possible illustration.

But we have also seen after decades of this and that in a totally different place like South Africa, that brighter and more positive perspectives can be possible. Three religions have an attachment to the area we speak of here, and the texts of all three mention Israel. This came as a surprise to me, when I first saw it, and I actually spent some time thinking about it. All three religions - all religions - have something unique to say to humans.

So inspired by the old scriptures, perhaps Israel has symbolised, and/or may one day come to symbolise, all of humanity.


Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor


CHANGE NEWS
CHANGE MANAGEMENT