Tuesday, November 28, 2017

Next War








28 November 2017

The Next War in the Middle East

By: Karsten Riise

After Syria, war again is coming to the Middle East. But where and how? And who will lose?



War lost in Syria and Iraq

Israel and Saudi Arabia have both lost their proxy-forces in Syria and Iraq - only the Kurds in northern Syria remain, confronted by Turkey. This has left Israel and Saudi Arabia naked. They will have to fight themselves. Israel and Saudi Arabia are now themselves the “proxy-forces” – of the USA.

After defeat by proxy, the aggressiveness of Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA against their image of “Iran” remains.

Traditional International Relations theory, especially the “realist” school, normally emphasizes (more or less objective) “state-interests” and “power-relations”, and not state-internal factors like ideology and leadership individuals, as drivers of international politics. But we must revise International Relations theory. Because here we cannot overlook the driving forces of emotions and the special leadership-personalities and the mutual connectedness in the leaderships of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the USA.

This should, however, not let us forget also to look at the background of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, where Paul Wolfowitz (rightly or wrongly), was quoted for saying: “The road to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad”. The vision of the USA was to “nip” Iraq, take Iran along, and continue a US sweep through Syria to Beirut. The US aim was not only to eliminate Saddam, but also Iran, Al-Assad, and Hezbollah (indeed everything deemed “evil”) on the way.

This big plan, if indeed it was one, has now, at end of 2017, at last failed utterly.


Alliance with inner fractures

After missing the Iran-war and losing influence after the bloody wars inside Iraq-Syria, there is a feeling of unfulfillment among the losers.

There is an enormous desire, an open aggressiveness publicly displayed,  in all the three leaderships of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and USA, for more war against what is spoken-of as “Iran”. On top of the sense of loss, there seems to be a psychological motif of “revenge” against an “Iran” daring not to fall victim, but instead crossing their plans for the Region. Feelings of hurt or even humiliated ambition may play in.

Creating mayhem may in this context even contain an objective by itself.

Israeli newspaper Haaretz now writes of Saudi Arabia as Israel’s possible “dreampartner” of choice. Israel prepares its Northern District for war, and stages its biggest air-force exercise ever. In the USA, the New York Times in an “official” article recently paints a romantic picture of Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia there are plans for a mega-city close to Israel with big US investors. A new Saudi leadership, ascending after talks with the USA, describes the US leader as “the right man at the right time”. Saudi Arabia denounces “Iran” in the Arab League. USA “decertifies” the Iran-deal for no objective reasons. There is an open “bromance” between the key top-persons in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the USA.

The bromance between Israel and Saudi Arabia is in many ways contradictory. Absent a mutual enemy-image (“Iran”), it would probably have deep cleavages. Imagine theoretically, if one Arab power could in 10 years take-over all power in all the Middle East surrounding Israel (and such a power might eventually become nuclear)  – could then Israel with the Holy City of Jerusalem not end-up isolated and taken-on also, at the end? Nobody in Israel seems wanting to apply such old concepts like “divide and rule”, now. Cool-headed realist thinking seems shrinking in Israel, where many seem absorbed by the illusionary simplicity of creating a “peace on their own terms” by attacking one single symbolic enemy-image, and “betting all the farm” on one perceived “dreampartner”.

Late King Al-Saudi, the founding father of Saudi Arabia, expressed great reservations (to put it mildly) against Israel in letters to US president Franklin Roosevelt, and these reservations probably continue in many powerful circles within Saudi Arabia. The latest changes in Saudi Arabia also affected someone, who had been cooperated at high level with US security interests. As Saddam Hussein, Gadhafi and Mubarak experienced, Arabs cooperating with the USA, will not necessarily see a pay-off.

In the USA, reciprocal reservations exist, symbolized by the unanimous (!) adoption in Congress as recently as last year (2016) of the “Justice against Sponsors of Terrorism Act”, which targets Saudi Arabia. US institutions, including State Department, take part in a deep inner US split over the latest developments in the Middle East.

The newfound “dream-alliance” has deep inner fractures.

Meanwhile, the mutually shared fear & aggressiveness against “Iran” are repeated so loudly in unison in Israel, Saudi Arabia and USA, that these aggressions nearly HAVE to find a physical expression. Especially more so, the more its other symbolic physical and diplomatic exertions seem to get them nowhere in Yemen, Qatar and Lebanon, and indirectly even in their relations with Turkey, which supports Qatar.

A multitude of mostly unrelated, but strongly destabilizing social currents, within their mutual partner Egypt, only strengthen their psychological feeling of being threatened. According to Robert Fisk, Egypt has about 60,000 political prisoners, some are religious, others are liberal. Egypt as a fourth ”dream-partner” is deeply fractured too, developing the same devastating signs of inner conflict, as Syria.


Some roads to War seem blocked

How can the combined aggressiveness against the symbolic image of “Iran” find an outlet?

Iraq seems today, end of 2017, after much, much bloodshed to be more unified than perhaps ever in her history since WWII. A Saudi invasion against Iraq to install an “anti-Iran” leadership in Baghdad, seems out of the question, at least for a very considerable time. This thereby also precludes a Saudi land-war against Iran, because Iraq is the only land-bridge connecting them. Syria seems also stabilized.

Facts on the ground leave Lebanon as the only second option for creating more serious mayhem, apart from the on-going starvation-war in Yemen.

For a possible war in Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the USA and not least the “Arab NATO” response-force of 40,000 soldiers with Egyptian participation under the Arab League, could all come into play.

But how?


Lebanon - first Option for more War

Saudi Arabia and her allies based in Egypt have no land-access to Lebanon. The only land-access would go through Israel. But transporting a large Sunni-Arab army peacefully through Israel, to make war in Lebanon, will not happen.

What might conceivably happen, could be a bizarre kind of “replay” of the 1956 Suez-War:

Israel could start to invade Lebanon from the South under any pretext whatsoever (Israel has never needed an excuse for invading Lebanon). As the Israeli military presses towards Beirut, the “Arab NATO” response force under Saudi leadership could insert land-troops (by ship from Alexandria) in Israeli occupied ports, to “persuade” Israel to “stop” her invasion and to “save” Arab Lebanon. Like the British-French “intervention” in Suez 1956, such a theatre would all be pre-arranged.

Once there, Saudi-led “Arab-NATO” forces (with US advice and support) could “regime-change” the Lebanese government, and start a (very long) war to wipe-out the war-trained Hezbollah. That such a venture would be a sure catastrophe for all involved, would not necessarily count as a relevant argument against it among those personalities, who would ponder it.

The necessary preparations could easily be bigger than the patience of its protagonists, and lack of preparations will equal disaster. Even for the most aggressive activist leaders, such an endeavor should beforehand look deterrently difficult – which does not necessary prevent them from starting it.



Last Option for War

As the “Lebanese option” above is extremely difficult, one ultimate option remains.

A last resort remains, for creating some greater-scale symbolic mayhem against the image of “Iran”. It’s the Americans’ favorite “quick-fix” substitute for a solution: Air attack.

Iran has virtually no modern combat aircraft, probably less than 50 up-to-date units for 1.4 million square-kilometers. For air defense, Iran is in practice undefended, even with a few Russian S-300 missiles for point defense. The magazines of Iran’s S-300 air-defense are shallow, and could be depleted with a first salvo of conventional missiles. Iran is an inviting target for air attack.

Iran’s nuclear installations serve both as symbolic pretext and object of an aggression. Saudi Arabia would herself have to handle retaliating Iranian missiles, so Saudi Arabia would need at least a minimal excuse for an air-raid. But Israel would not even need a fig leaf of excuse for attacking.

And what other way would be more “easy”, most assertively symbolic, showing-off Israel’s power and status, and with assuredly no own casualties (at least in the first round), than using Israel’s Jericho missiles. Israeli missiles, which in order to create enough destruction & demonstration to achieve the war-objectives, could be fit with nuclear tips.

Air attack against Iran – either with air planes (Saudi Arabia) or missiles (Israel) – is tempting to start in anger. But a long-drawn conflict, including a very long oil-blockade in the Persian Gulf, would ensue. Such an action, once started, would be nearly impossible to end.


Next War – the Outcome

Some months ago, I started research for this article, because I saw at that point, that Saudi Arabia had perspectives to become a very important global power. However, within the last 6 months, a lot of cards have been played - and lost. The situation is now very different.

Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA have lost already - they stand to lose again. If they do nothing, they will lose more, as Iran and Iraq gain from international trade, and Syria and Hezbollah build up themselves.

But Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA will not do nothing, that is for sure. This is not their style - or temper. They will do something.

But anything on a greater scale which they can do, is at risk of releasing such fateful events, that in the end, they will lose much more.


Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor


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